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Citizenship Deprivation as an Act of Persecution: Case Study of the Assam Citizen
Exercise As A Precursor to A Nation-Wide Determination of Citizenship
By Ishita Chakrabarty
Abstract
This essay explores the reasons behind describing India’s Citizenship practices (now modified
through the Citizenship Amendment Act 2019) as ‘persecutory’. In doing so, the essay refers to
the international law on citizenship conferment and withdrawal that has traditionally been
viewed as exclusive to a state’s sovereign domain. The essay also looks into the socio-political
dynamics, past persecutory conduct exemplified by the Assam-NRC exercise and the lack of
protection afforded by those entrusted with the legal duty of conferring and withdrawing
citizenship. The essay further uses the Assam-NRC exercise as a case study to claim that there
exist well-founded grounds for believing that a subsequent action of this nature will involve real
risks for the country’s 200 million Muslim population.
I

Introduction

In December 2019, the Indian Government passed the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 2019,
on the pretext of providing citizenship to those fleeing religious persecution. Although the
preamble of the Amendment Act contains no mention of “persecution”,1 the Statement of
Objects and Reasons as it stood in the Bill at the time of introduction 2 and the Union
government’s own affidavit before the Supreme Court of India (SC)3 claim that the Act serves a
humanitarian purpose of providing relief to those who are “forced to seek shelter in India due to
persecution on grounds of religion”. 4



Research Officer at Quill Foundation, New Delhi, India, E-mail: ishita.chakrabarty24@gmail.com
Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, No. 47 of 2019, an Act further to amend the Citizenship Act, 1955, online:
The Gazette of India <http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/214646.pdf> [“CAA, 2019”].
2
Lok Sabha, “Synopsis of Debates” (2019), online (pdf):
<http://loksabhadocs.nic.in/Synop/17/II/2Supp+Supp+Syn-09-12-2019.pdf>.
3
Indian Union of Muslim League v Union of India (2019), Supreme Court of India, Counter Affidavit of the Union
of India, Writ Petition (C) No. 1470 of 2019, online: <https://scobserverproduction.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/case_document/document_upload/1191/Counter_Affidavit_filed_by_Union.
pdf>.
4
The Amendment Bill was originally introduced in the Parliament in 2015.
1
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The Act amends the provisions of the Citizenship Act, 1955, along with the provisions of the
Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Passport Act, 1920 and their consequent rules. The 2019 Act
declares that all those travelling from the Muslim-majority countries of Pakistan, Bangladesh and
Afghanistan without valid documents or overstaying their travel limits, will not be categorized as
“illegal migrants”, as long as they are non-Muslims.5 It further allows these individuals an
expedited route to citizenship through naturalization, reducing the period under the 1955 Act
from eleven years to five years, in case they entered the territory before 31 December 2014.
Once naturalized, their citizenship status is backdated to this proposed cut-off date.6
The Act’s enactment saw the breakout of large-scale protests and communal violence across the
country.7 Internationally as well, India’s move drew condemnation from all quarters over the
glaring omission of Muslims. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(UNHCR) filed an intervention application before the Supreme Court, on the ground that the
Act, though commendable in its purpose, was clearly discriminatory and violated India’s
international obligations.8 The Union Government rebutted with the flawed argument that
Muslims could not face persecution in Muslim-majority countries, and even if they did, they
could seek refuge in other Islamic nations.9
Noticeably, the intervention was confined to refugee-specific issues. As will be seen, limiting the
question to issues of immigration, allows states to claim the ground of security and sovereignty
to justify their actions. Most of the petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Act are
premised on how it contravenes principles of secularism and equality that rest with all persons,
including refugees, and have been previously adjudged as part of the basic unalterable structure
to the Indian Constitution.10
5

CAA, 2019, s. 2. The Act specifically exempts Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis, Jains and Buddhists from these
documents.
6
Ibid at s. 3.
7
Sanya Mansoor & Billy Perrigo, “‘This is not just a Muslim fight.’ Inside the Anti-Citizenship Act Protests
Rocking India”, Time (19 December 2019), online: <https://time.com/5752186/india-protests-citizenship-act/>.
8
IFS (Retd). & Ors. V Union of India (2019), W.P. (Civil) no. 1474 of 2019, “Application for intervention by
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights”, online:
<https://www.scribd.com/document/449928296/Draft-Intervention-application-on-behalf-ofOHCHR#from_embed>
9
Rajya Sabha, “Supplement to Synopsis of Debate”, (11 December 2019) at 561, online (pdf):
<http://164.100.47.5/newsynopsis1/englishsessionno/250/Suppl.%20Synopsis%20_E_%20dated%2011.12.pdf>.
10
See, Sanya Talwar, “CAA Challenge: SC Issues Notice in Fresh Batch Of Petitions, Tags Them With 160 Pending
Pleas Seeking Similar Prayer”, LiveLaw (20 May 2020), online: <https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/caa-challengesc-issues-notice-in-fresh-batch-of-petitions-tags-them-with-160-pending-pleas-seeking-similar-prayer-157076>.
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But in March 2020, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
convened a hearing where it was noted that the Act’s effect – intended or unintended – could be
the disenfranchisement of Indian Muslims.11 Throughout the hearing, experts continued to draw
parallels between the CAA and the Citizenship Act of Myanmar that has seen the ethnic
cleansing of minority groups like the Rohingyas.12
Since then, discussions have largely revolved around how the Act, seen alongside the National
Population Register (NPR) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC) - both of which arise
from the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules of
2003 - are mere hoodwinks for the larger statelessness project that the current populist regime
has in its mind in an effort to create a ‘Hindu state’, tending to the Hindu majority. 13 The NRC is
supposed to be a definitive list of who belongs to India, drawn from the larger NPR. The NPR is
a dataset of ‘usual residents’ (at the local, sub-district, district, state and national levels),
composed of persons who have resided in an area for 6 months or more or who intend on doing
so.14 The pilot project was supposed to commence in April 2020, but has since been deferred.
Amidst fears of inadequate documentation to prove citizenship, the Union Home Minister
claimed that the government would “throw away all infiltrators”, but no “Hindu, Sikh, Jain,
Christian or Buddhist” need worry – clearly excluding the State’s 200 million Muslim
population.15 Another Parliamentarian justified the exclusionary exercise under the CAA,
claiming that Muslims are “not equal” to Hindus.16 In the background of increased
dehumanization, hate speeches, and physical violence against the Indian Muslim community, the
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, “Legislation Factsheet India: The Citizenship
(Amendment) Act India” (February 2020), online (pdf):
<https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2020%20Legislation%20Factsheet%20-%20India_0_0.pdf>.
12
“United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Hearing: Citizenship Laws and Religious
Freedom”, Atlantic Council (4 March 2020), online: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/eventrecap/united-states-commission-on-international-religious-freedom-hearing-citizenship-laws-and-religiousfreedom/>; European Parliament, “Motion for a Resolution on India’s Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019”,
Plenary Sitting (2020), B9-0079/2020, online(pdf): <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-20200079_EN.html>.
13
Uday Chandra, “The Making of a Hindu India”, Al Jazeera (24 August 2020), online:
<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/making-hindu-india-200820104806024.html>.
14
Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules (2003), [India]Central
Government Act, rule 2(l).
15
“Will throw out each infiltrator one by one, says Amit Shah”, Hindu BusinessLine (1 October 2019), online:
<https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/national/will-throw-out-each-infiltrator-one-by-one-says-amitshah/article29567841.ece>.
16
Vice News, “Interview of Subramaniam Swamy to Isobel Yeung” (1 April 2020), online: Twitter
<https://twitter.com/i/status/1245413627504414720>
11
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UN Special Adviser on Prevention of Genocide and Under-Secretary General, Adama Dieng,
was forced to raise concerns. 17 Similar ministerial statements and the example of the Assam
NRC have stoked fears about how the NPR and the NRC could disenfranchise certain
communities, while allowing certain others to find their way through, under the CAA 2019. 18
The NRC was first conceived and prepared in 1951 in the north-east Indian state of Assam under
the Assam Accord, to put a check to immigration from its neighboring country (Bangladesh). It
was drawn over the population census for the same year, and a revised version was under
preparation in the state (after a brief halt) until 2019, when the final list was published. 19 This
exercise to define citizenship has seen three lists, with the final list excluding up to 1.9 million
people - and is now being contemplated in the rest of the nation. But the Assam exercise has
been controversial for reasons beyond the resulting withdrawal of nationality; it has been
additionally described as ‘persecutory’. 20
Several international bodies, including the UN Treaty mechanisms, had expressed their
apprehensions over the particularly hostile attitude of NRC officials against Muslims, and those
of Bengali descent, stating that the procedure could potentially exclude genuine citizens. 21 The
State’s move had even prompted the Genocide Watch to put Assam on the Watch List. 22

United Nations, Press Release, “Note to Media on India by Under-Secretary General Adama Dieng, UN Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide” (18 May 2020), online: UN Meetings Coverage & Press Releases
<https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/18052020_SA%20note%20to%20media%20on%20India_fi
nal.pdf>.
18
Supra note 10. Similar concerns have been raised by the Petitioners in the Indian Union Muslim League case, that
challenged the constitutionality of the Amendment.
19
“Explained: What is the Assam Accord that is fueling protests in the State”, Indian Express (13 December 2019),
online: <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-what-is-the-assam-accord-citizenship-amendmentbill-protests-6164018/>.
20
Abdul Kalam Azad, “Assam NRC: A History of Violence and Persecution”, The Wire (15 August 2018), online:
<https://thewire.in/rights/assam-nrc-a-history-of-violence-and-persecution>.
21
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on
minority issues; the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
related intolerance; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Special Procedures Commission Report,
OL IND 13/2018 (11 June 2018) online:
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23884>; Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mandates of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; the
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief; the Special Rapporteur on minority issues and the Special
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Special
Procedures Commission Report, OL IND 29/2018 (13 December 2018) online:
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24247>.
22
Dr. Gregory H. Stanton, “Genocide Watch for Assam, India – renewed”, Genocide Watch (18 August 2019),
online: <https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/2019/08/18/Genocide-Watch for-Assam-India---renewed>.
17
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Although these are not necessarily legal assessments of whether genocide has occurred or is
underway, they have political ramifications and often take into account State intent as visible in
fact.23
This paper seeks to explore how the Assam NRC has been ‘persecutory’ and why there exists a
fear of a subsequent all-India exercise being the same. As a preliminary matter, the first section
deals with the right to a nationality and the stringent substantive and procedural safeguards
preceding deprivations of nationality, leading to statelessness. The second section examines
whether such deprivations could amount to ‘persecution’. The final section deals with the
preparation of the NRC in the state of Assam and its replication across the country.
II

Nationality and Statelessness

Nationality or citizenship has been described as the “right to have rights”, and the denial of this
right, has been equated with a denial of juridical personality. 24 In its absence, states can disregard
an individual’s rights when asserted against the state or other individuals.25 Both nationality and
citizenship are markers of state membership. However, while nationality operates in the
international realm, citizenship operates in the municipal realm and is understood in terms of the
rights and obligations that a member bears under municipal laws. 26 The latter is thus variable in
scope. For instance, in the absence of citizenship, the Rohingyas in Myanmar are prohibited from
having more than two children, disbarred from holding property, have no rights to marry without
prior permission, and so on.27
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), provided for the first time
that everyone had a “right to a nationality”, and the corollary right to not be arbitrarily deprived
of it. Prior to this, nationality had been adjudged as lying solely within the state domain, 28 and

See, David Scheffer, “Genocide and Atrocity Crimes” (2006) 1:3 Genocide Studies and Prevention 229.
Alison Kesby, The right to have rights: citizenship, humanity, and international law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012), ch 2 at 62.
25
Girls Yean and Bosico v Dominican Republic (2005), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 130 at paras 178-179.
26
Paul Weiss, Nationality and Statelessness In International Law, 2nd ed (Germantown, Maryland: Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1979) at 4-5.
27
Engy Abdelkar, “The History of the Persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya”, The Conversation (21 September
2017), online: <https://theconversation.com/the-history-of-the-persecution-of-myanmars-rohingya-84040>.
28
Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, 8th ed (David Mckay Company Inc,1955) at 642; Case of the Exchange of
Greek and Turkish Populations (1925), Advisory Opinion, PCIJ (Ser B) No. 10 at 19.
23
24
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hence considered a “privilege”. 29 This view was reiterated under the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, and in the famous Nottebohm
judgement of the International Court of Justice. 30 Although both, the Convention and the
judgement acknowledged that a state’s municipal law on nationality should be consistent with
international conventions, customs and general principles of international law, a state that acts in
contravention of such international developments does not bear any repercussions, except that
other states need not give recognition to such consequences. 31 Moreover, the right to nationality
under the UDHR has been criticized for not putting the onus on a specific state to confer such
nationality.32 This conception of nationality being a privilege has also seeped into other
Conventions subsequently enacted, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,33 the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,34 the Convention
on the Rights of Child etc.,35 which only make a passing reference to nationality, and more
specifically to nationality of children.
Thus, former Secretary of State of the United Kingdom, David Owen, noted that Hannah
Arendt’s description of nationality as the “right to have rights” is still valid today in spite of a
robust human rights framework. In his words, its loss is both “wrongful and harmful”, since it
deprives an individual of exercising his political rights, and exposes him to insecurity, because
he is unable to access resources.36 But more importantly, without nationality, an individual

Flavia Zorzi Giustiniani, “Deprivation of Nationality: In Defence of a Principled Approach” (2016) 31 Questions
of Int’t L 5 at 19.
30
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 12 April 1930, 179 LNTS
89 (entered 1 July 1937); Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala)(second phase), [1955] ICJ Rep 4 at 23.
31
Ibid.
32
David Owen, “On the Right to Have Nationality Rights: Statelessness, Citizenship and Human Rights” (2018) 65
Netherlands Int’l L Rev 299. Current provisions as they exist discuss how individuals are entitled to a nationality
(for instance, Article 15 of the UDHR states, the right to “a” nationality). However, the debate must shift to an
examination of the right to hold a particular state’s nationality.
33
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 arts 9—14 (entered into
force 23 March 1976) [ICCPR].
34
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, 660
UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) at art. 5(iii).
35
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2
September 1990) at art 5.
36
Owen, supra note 32 at 300-301.
29
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possesses no associated rights to residence within the borders and hence can be forcibly
displaced and deported, 37 or even indefinitely detained.38
Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention on Status of Stateless Persons defines a ‘stateless person as
one who is not considered a national by any state under the operation of its law’;39 whereas the
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (“1961 Convention”) 40 provides for
measures to prevent and reduce statelessness. Several scholars have noted the lack of attention
paid by the international community to stateless people (as opposed to refugees) 41 - apart from
these two International Conventions, and one regional Convention (European Convention on
Nationality, 1977), the literature on statelessness is rather sparse. This is also confirmed by the
number of states that are signatories to the Refugee Convention (145) as opposed to the two
Conventions on statelessness (74 states are signatories to the 1954 Convention; and 45 states are
signatories to the 1961 Convention).
The 1961 Convention lays down what amounts to “withdrawal of nationality” that results in
statelessness. Withdrawal can either be a consequence of operation of laws, also termed as “loss
of nationality”,42 or through action of state authorities, also termed as “deprivation of
nationality”.43 In the former case, withdrawal is usually on account of different practices of
citizenship conferment (jus soli or jus sanguinis, or discriminatory gender provisions), state
succession, transfer or incorporation of new territory. In the latter case, it could be a result of loss
of birth certificates required for applications, lack of administrative capabilities, corruption or
irregular processing of certificates, unrealistic time frames for registration, or even prior flight as
a refugee. As will subsequently be demonstrated, statelessness does not operate between such
binaries.

UNHCR, Expert meeting — the concept of stateless persons under international law, 2010 at para. B.7, online:
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ca1a e002.html>.
38
Anudo Ochieng Anudo v Republic of Tanzania (2018), African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights Judgment,
App No 012/2015 at paras 118, 120-121.
39
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 28 September 1954, 360 UNTS 117 (entered into force 6
June 1960).
40
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30 August 1961, 989 UNTS 175 (entered into force 13 December
1975).
41
See, Maryellen Fullerton, “The Intersection of Statelessness and Refugee Protection in US Asylum Policy”,
(2014) 2:3 J on Migration and Human Security 144(“stateless persons are largely unnoticed”); Flavia Giustiniani,
supra note 29.
42
1961 Convention, supra note 40 at articles 5-7.
43
1961 Convention, supra note 40 at articles 8 and 9.
37
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Although the conferral or withdrawal of nationality is a sovereign function of the state,
international law prohibits any arbitrary withdrawal of nationality. 44 The UNHCR Guidelines to
the 1961 Convention45 define “arbitrary withdrawal” as one: (1) without any legal basis, (2)
disproportionate to the aims sought, and (3) inflicted without due process safeguards. Arbitrary
withdrawal can take several forms, including where the state authorities prevent individuals from
acquiring or retaining their nationality, or where they cease to consider individuals or a collective
as their national. Expulsion, confiscation of relevant documents, or statements proclaiming that
the concerned persons are not their nationals, suffice to show such withdrawal. 46
(a)

Substantive Aspects of Deprivation

Usually, international law restricts withdrawal of citizenship from individuals who would
otherwise be left stateless. 47 Any deprivation of citizenship must be legally prescribed 48 and
limited to “naturalized persons” who have acquired nationality through fraudulent means or
misrepresentation, or shown their allegiance to another state, or committed acts that are
“seriously prejudicial” and “threaten vital interests of the state”. 49 These are punitive measures
that are allowed to the state - provided they also satisfy the condition of proportionality. That is,
the state must usually look to other less intrusive measures.50 Apart from this, human rights
treaties impose more exacting requirements, where states must evaluate if deprivation could
affect other rights, such as those of family and private life. 51 Usually acts of terrorism, or

44

United Nations Human Rights Council, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality: Report of the
Secretary-General, 13th Sess, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/34, December 2009 at para 23, online:
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b83a9cb2.html>.
45
The Guidelines serve as interpretative guidance for decision-makers and reveal existing treaty laws and customary
international law, along with progressive developments in human rights. UNHCR, Guidelines on Statelessness No.
5: Loss and Deprivation of Nationality under Articles 5-9 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,
UN Doc, HCR/GS/20/05, May 2020, online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5ec5640c4.html>.
46
Ibid at para 9.
47
1961 Convention, supra note 40 at art 8(1).
48
Supra note 45 at para 55.
49
1961 Convention, supra note 40 at art 8(3).
50
Supra note 45 at paras. 50-52, 61-62.
51
See, UDHR, Article 12 read with Article 16(3); ICCPR, Articles 17(1) and 23; ICESCR, Article 10; CRC, Article
16; ICRMW, Article 44; and regional treaties such as ECHR, Article 8. See also, Hoti v Croatia, App No 63311/14
(ECtHR, 26 April 2018) at paras 96, 122 (discussing the positive obligation of states to ensure the effective
enjoyment of private life and right to family and the fact that the Applicant had lived in Latvia for almost the entire
duration of her life and had close contacts there, should have acted as a constraint upon the State); Slivenko v Latvia,
App No 4832/199 (ECtHR, 9 October 2003) at para 122 (discussing that even in situations of national security’,
states must always make individualised statements taking into consideration the specific situations of the applicant).
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adoption of citizenship by fraudulent means in the absence of which citizenship could have never
been acquired by the individual, could be serious enough to meet this criterion.
However, deprivation - whether legislative or administrative - is absolutely prohibited if it is
based on discriminatory grounds, irrespective of whether or not the person is left stateless.52 This
provision is thus broad enough to cover policies and actions where, although it is impossible to
show a discriminatory intention, a discriminatory impact is apparent. 53 The absolute nature of
this prohibition arises not merely from the cohort of Statelessness Conventions which anyway
have few signatories, but from the jus cogens nature of the prohibition on racial discrimination. 54
Thus, a perusal of the Statelessness Conventions shows that withdrawal of citizenship from
certain categories of individuals is more onerous as compared to the others: it affords greater
protection to those with single nationality (who would on withdrawal become stateless); and
absolute protection to those deprived on the basis of their protected identities. Moreover, even
under the most extreme situations, it limits deprivation to only “naturalized” citizens - leading to
the presumption that birth citizens cannot be stripped of their nationality rights. 55
(b)

Procedural Aspects of Deprivation

Any act of deprivation must be subject to fair trial standards;56 the individual must be provided
with reasons in writing, so as to allow him the opportunity to challenge the decision. All such
decisions must be based on individualized assessments,57 and must be confirmed by a court or
any other independent authority, after providing the individual with a hearing on the merits. In
case of a confirmation, they are also entitled to an appeal. Individuals must continue to retain
their nationality up till the conclusion of such hearings.58

52

1961 Convention, art 9.
Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v Dominican Republic (2014), Inter-AM Ct HR (Ser C) No 282 at para 263.
54
International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries’” (2001) 2:2 Yearbook of the Int’l L Commission 31, p. 85 at para 5.
55
This appears to be the case, even though para. 112 of the UNHCR Guidelines mentions that no distinction must be
drawn between naturalized and birth citizens. See, Luca Bucken and Rene de Groot, “Deprivation of Nationality
under Article 8(3) of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness” (2018) 25:1 Maastricht J of European
and Comparative L 38 (enlisting declarations submitted for grounds under which nationality can be withdrawn,
including for crimes of terrorism, disloyalty to state, or criminal offences within a certain period after
naturalization). Even in the most serious of cases, they have been limited to naturalized citizens.
56
1961 Convention, art 8(4).
57
Supra note 45 at paras. 76-77.
58
Ibid at paras 72-75, 98, 100.
53
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Moreover, deprivation itself does not entitle the state to detain or restrict the individual’s
movements. The state must only resort to restrictions when necessary, and these restrictions must
be periodically reviewed. 59 Otherwise, temporally indefinite restrictions - where individuals are
kept without access to information and procedural rights - can assume the form of ill-treatment
and torture.60
(c)

Acts of Persecution?

The term “persecution” is mentioned under International Criminal Law (ICL), International
Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Refugee Law (IRL) regimes. ICL defines the crime
of persecution as any act or omission which in fact, denies or violates a fundamental right as laid
down under international treaty or customary law. 61 Apart from the actus reus, ICL also requires
existence of the chapeau elements (widespread or systematic nature of actions) and showing of a
“special intent” to discriminate on any of the prohibited grounds of race, religion, nationality,
etc. These additional requirements are required for the limited purpose of imputing individual
criminal responsibility upon specific actors. 62
On the other hand, IHRL generally concerns itself with “discrimination”, and confines itself to
findings of state responsibility through the attribution of conduct, either under the primary or
secondary rules.63 Finally, the IRL regime has no accepted definition of “persecution”, although
the definition of a ‘refugee’ rests upon such a finding.64 In fact, according to Hugo Storey, the
only certainty offered by the refugee law text is over the interaction between the persecutor and
the persecuted. The interaction is such that the individual cannot seek or refuses to seek the

59

Ibid at para 102.
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, 22nd Sess, UN Doc. A/HRC/37/50, February 2018 at para 27 online:
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session37/Documents/A_HRC_37_50_EN.docx>.
61
Elements of Crime, Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010)
(1998); Prosecutor v Popovic et al, IT-05-88-A, Appeal Judgment (30 January 2015) at para 762(International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber).
62
Ibid.
63
See, “State Responsibility: First Report on State Responsibility by James Crawford, Special Rapporteur” (1998),
UN Doc. A/CN.4/490 and Add. 1–7 at paras 14-15, 27.
64
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention defines a Refugee as one who has a well-founded fear of being
persecuted on the basis of his membership (real or perceived) with enlisted groups (race, religion, nationality, a
social group, or those holding certain political beliefs).
60
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assistance of his state (unable or unwilling standard). Additionally, such interaction must be
currently persisting.65
Since the qualification of an act and the attribution of responsibility involve different
evaluations, this paper draws primarily from IRL and the actus reus of the ICL regime. In fact,
ICL and IRL have converged before in some instances.66 To cite one such instance, IRL has
assisted in the development of jurisprudence on gender-based persecution under the Rome
Statute,67 even though a full import of the former into the latter is not possible since their
underlying purposes are different. 68
As far as this paper is concerned showing a lack of state protection will suffice, discriminatory
intent on the part of individual state officials does not need to be proved. Additionally, it draws
upon the experiences of others from the same community to build into the persecution
assessment; since the aim here is not to seek asylum, there arises no question of “individual
circumstances”. Finally, it relies on the showing of “past persecution” to claim that a rebuttable
presumption of “well-founded fear” of subsequent persecution arises over the nationwide
citizenship exercise proposed. 69
This scheme of looking at the act, coupled with an institutional failure to protect or lack of
redress, also has the advantage of obviating the presumption that only nationals from conflictridden, repressive, and failed states are persecuted. As an example, consider the following
statement of the UNHCR: “The U.N. refugee agency warns populist politics and fearmongering
about immigration are eroding international protection for refugees fleeing conflict and

Hugo Storey, “What Constitutes Persecution? Towards a Working Definition” (2014) 26:2 Int’l J of Refugee L
272.
66
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Expert Meeting on Complementarities between International Refugee Law,
International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law (11-13 April 2011) at paras 4, 14-15 online:
<https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4e1729d52.pdf>.
67
For more, see, Valerie Oosterveld, “Gender, Persecution and, the International Criminal Court: Refugee Law’s
Relevance to the Crime Against Humanity of Persecution” (2006) 17 Duke J of Int’l & Comparative L 49.
68
See, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment (14 January 2000) (International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), where the Trial Chamber itself has warned against such a full-scale
import of persecution definition.
69
Establishment of a ‘well-founded fear’ is closely linked to the question of ‘return’ (to the country of origin) and
by corollary, availing international protection. See, House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union,
Defining Refugee Status and those in need of International Protection, (HL 2001-02, 156) Article 5 at para 19
online: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldselect/ldeucom/156/156.pdf>.
65
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persecution”.70 Thus, the general presumption is that those in need of international protection are
the ones fleeing conflict or failed states, while populist states are merely the recipients of such
individuals. In fact, populist regimes that survive through acts of ‘othering’ and claim to
represent the will of the nation are more likely to be illiberal and capable of stripping the
independence of institutions responsible for upholding civil liberties. 71
III

Defining Persecution and its Constitutive Elements

Several scholars have noted that there purposely exists no definition of persecution, since not all
such acts can be listed. To do otherwise, would be limiting. Rather, it must be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis, to see the nature of rights violated (such as those of dignity and integrity),
and the manner and gravity of such violation. 72 Some state legislations, such as Australia’s
Migration Act, 1958 (Cth) (amended in 2003), have attempted to define persecution. However,
they are not comprehensive, since they exist for the limited purpose of an asylum seeker’s
admittance into a specific state, 73 and not for a larger question before the international
community of whether persecution is underway. The benefit of the latter is that it would allow
states to intervene before such persecution-related consequences (in this case, statelessness) are
effected.
The English Court of Appeal has previously relied on Professor Hathaway’s definition to hold
that persecution comprises a systemic or sustained deprivation of core entitlements (nonderogable rights) or of derogable rights in a discriminatory manner, whether by the state or nonstate actors (and there is no effective state remedy). 74 Nevertheless, threats to life or freedom,

Lisa Schlein, “UN: Populist politics eroding international protection for refugees”, Voice of America (4 October
2018), online: <https://www.voanews.com/europe/un-populist-politics-eroding-international-protection-refugees>.
71
See, Dagny Anderson et al.,“The Global Implications of Populism on Democracy - Task Force 2018”, University
of Washington: The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies (2018), online (pdf):
<https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Task-Force_C_2018_Pekkanen_robert.pdf>.
72
Guy S Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 3rd ed, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007) at 93-94; Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson, “Refugee protection in international law: an overall
perspective” in Erika Feller, Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson, eds, Refugee Protection in International Law
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2003) 3 at 39.
73
Storey, supra note 65 at 275.
74
Ravichandran v Secretary of State for the Home Department, United Kingdom: Court of Appeal [England and
Wales], 11 October 1995, online: <https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_CA_CIV,3ae6b677c.html>.
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acts that are likely to result in death or torture, or oppression of religious beliefs, mala fide
imposition of penalties, are at minimum, accepted as acts of persecution. 75
Further, state legislations, such as the Migration Act, 1958 (Cth) of Australia (s. 91R), could still
serve as an indicator for what states believe amounts to persecution. The provision states that
persecution must result in “serious harm” and arise on account of the individual’s membership,
real or perceived, of a protected group. It must also be systematic. It then lists certain acts that
could constitute “serious harm” such as: (a) threats to life and liberty, (b) significant physical
harassment or ill treatment, (c) denial of access to basic services which directly threaten one’s
subsistence.
Hathaway’s definition without the systematic (or persistent) element, has also been adopted by
the EU’s Qualification Directive (QD). The QD also includes legal, administrative, prosecutorial
and judicial acts that are imposed discriminatorily, and denial of judicial redress, under a nonexhaustive list of acts that could amount to persecution.76 Although Hugo Storey adds that such
judicial measures must not be merely “shortcomings”, but amount to “flagrant denial” of fair
trial rights itself.77 However, qualification purposes demand that there is precision on whether a
specific act could amount to persecution. Otherwise, even broadly worded laws can be limited by
subjective interpretations. 78 The following subsection deals with whether (or not) deprivation of
nationality could amount to persecution.
(a)

Denial of Nationality as Persecution

Lambert and Foster note that nationality withdrawals have not been particularly categorized as
“persecution”, since statelessness and refugee-hood have been traditionally conceived as

75

Storey, supra note 65 at 275-278.
Qualification Directive, 2004, Articles 9 (1) and (2). Article 9(2) head note reads as: “acts of persecution as
identified in paragraph (1) can take the form of…”.
77
Storey, supra note 65 at p. 284.
78
For instance, the Swiss law on persecution {Federal Law on Asylum, art. 3(2)} is seemingly broad (including
threat to life, limb or freedom and ‘measures that entail an unbearable psychological pressure’). Although the term
was initially inferred as including measures that ‘make it impossible for a person to lead a life of dignity’, in several
later cases, acts drastically limiting religious freedom of individuals or acts of ethnic cleansing without murder or
torture, have been dismissed as not amounting to persecution. See, Francesco Maiani, “The Concept of “Persecution
in Refugee Law: Indeterminacy, Context-sensitivity, and the Quest for a Principled Approach” (2020) online: Les
Dossiers du Grihl <http://journals.openedition.org/dossiersgrihl/3896> at footnotes 22-24.
76
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exclusive, and the former as lying within the sovereign domain. 79 The existing literature lacks in
presuming that stateless individuals are vulnerable and in extreme instances could be exposed to
persecution through “othering”. What it fails to consider is that statelessness itself could be a
result of persecution - the “final persecutory act”.80 For instance, the UNHCR handbook on
Statelessness recommends states to carry out nationality campaigns and verification
procedures,81 without considering that states that have willingly divested individuals of their
nationality are unlikely to bring them back into the body politic.
David Owen concedes that political dynamics could lead to an en masse deprivation of
nationality, as in the case of the Rohingyas (overt exclusion of Rohingyas from recognized
‘ethnic groups’ conferred citizenship under the 1982 Act), or the European Romas (through
discriminatory practices during processing of documents).82 He notes how States use both overt
and covert practices in depriving individuals of nationality by creating difficulties for certain
communities as in the case of African countries, or through stringent interpretations of laws as in
the case of Malaysia. In another instance in the Dominican Republic, the State excluded those of
Haitian descent by initially refusing to confer birth certificates and later asking them to produce
the same certificates – thereby retroactively stripping their citizenship.
But in 2010 and 2011, the US Federal Court passed two decisions, which according to Professor
Fullerton,83 allowed for at least raising a presumption of persecution in cases where the state
withdrew an individual’s nationality. Thus, in Haile v. Holder,84 an Ethiopian citizen of Eritrean
origin was deprived of his nationality, in the context of ethnic hostilities following Eritrea's
independence.85 Despite any additional evidence of his ever being harassed, arrested or
targeted,86 the Appeals Court held that the immigration authorities’ decision denying persecution
was unsustainable. While it did not adjudge the merits of the Appellant’s claim, it observed that
79

Helene Lambert & Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and the Protection of Stateless Persons (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), ch 5 at 146. Note that they approach the issue from the lens of failure of the host
states in granting refugee status.
80
Ibid at 146-147.
81
See, Inter‑Parliamentary Union with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Nationality and
Statelessness, Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 22” ( July 2014) at 20, online (pdf): <
https://www.refworld.org/docid/53d0a0974.html>
82
Owen, supra note 32 at 303-308.
83
See, Fullerton, supra note 41.
84 591 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2010)
85 Ibid at 573-75.
86 Ibid at 495.
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there is a difference between denying citizenship (for instance, to long-term residents) and
divesting someone of citizenship (in this case, a birth citizen). The latter, especially when
undertaken over ethnic basis, could amount to a “particularly acute form of persecution”. 87
In another decision, Stserba v. Holder,88 an Estonian citizen of Russian origin initially lost her
citizenship after the former’s independence (over newly enacted laws). Although she managed to
regain her citizenship through naturalization, Estonia brought out a law that restricted economic
opportunities for those who received their qualifications from Russian Universities.89 With
respect to her claim of persecution, the immigration judge noted that long-term residents of
Russian origin could access most of the rights - including residence, travel documents, and
political participation at the local level, and that 65,000 Russian origin Estonians, had already
been naturalized.90 The Appellate court again made some exemplary observations - that the
question should not have been restricted to actual harm, since in the absence of citizenship, the
rights that these individuals enjoyed stood on precarious grounds.91 More importantly, it
observed that even neutral-appearing laws could be used to target a vulnerable population. 92
In brief, both these decisions show that (a) statelessness itself without anything further, suffices
the “severe harm” standards - although it may not always amount to persecution; 93 (b)
affirmative actions of state lead to a higher presumption of persecution as opposed to the failure
to confer; (c) that the authorities must not only evaluate legislations and policies, but also look at
their possible impact and the context behind such implementation; and (d) statelessness when
linked with a protected ground, will always amount to persecution 94.
In spite of the limited jurisprudence on statelessness per se amounting to persecution, both ICL95
and IRL96 agree that acts can also cumulatively lead to persecution. As mentioned previously,
nationality rights are concomitant with other rights, including those of residence, liberty, access
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Ibid at 573-74 and Haile v Gonzales, 421 F. 3d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 2005).
646 F.3d 904 (6th Cir.).
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Ibid at 968-69.
90
Ibid at 971-74.
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Ibid at 974.
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Ibid at 975.
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See, Choudry v Canada, [2011] FC 1406 (Can.), at paras. 32-40.
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Fullerton, supra note 41.
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Prosecutor v Kvocka et al, IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal Judgment (28 February 2005), at para 321.
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International Refugee Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 62.
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to employment and basic services in the absence of which individuals can be forcibly displaced,
restricted or detained, or face substantial risks to their livelihood. 97
Despite the now growing body of literature on nationality rights and statelessness, there still
exists drawbacks to state evaluations of persecution. For one, Foster and Lambert note that there
is a general reluctance amongst scholars to discuss the historical and socio-political backgrounds
to conferment or withdrawal of nationality, despite the overwhelming number of stateless people
belonging to the minority community. 98 As an example, they observe how UK tribunals have
rejected asylum applications from members of the Bidoon community – a minority in Kuwait –
on the grounds that the state has already set up a review committee to evaluate whether the
members of the community are eligible for citizenship, without assessing further if the
committee’s analysis is effective, and decision independently arrived at. 99
In India, citizenship has largely been a function of communal, casteist, linguistic and sectarian
tendencies, post-partition. However, religious antagonism seems to have overshadowed them all.
Thus, to understand the dynamics of citizenship conferral and withdrawal that started with
Assam and is now threatening to take effect over the rest of India, it would be necessary to
examine the socio-political contexts within these entities.
(b)

A Brief Account of Muslim Citizenship in A Majoritarian State

Several scholarly works, mostly within the context of politics and ethics of the Indian
Constitution, have highlighted the construction of Muslim identities through citizenship in postpartition India. In fact, whether (or not) citizenship should be conferred on the basis of religious
identities without anything further, formed an essential part of the Constituent Assembly Debates
during the framing of the Constitution. Prior to the enactment of the Citizenship Act, 1955, the
Constitution followed a unique combination of jus soli and jus sanguinis principles for
acquisition of nationality – with all those born and resident in undivided India entitled to
citizenship – unless they migrated to the newly created state of Pakistan.
97

For ICL cases, see, Prosecutor v Milorad Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, Appeal Judgment (17 September 2003) at paras
221-222 (over forced displacement of civilian population); Prosecutor v Kordic & Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal
Judgment (17 December 2004) at paras 1039-1043 (over deprivation of liberty). See, Ming Dai v Sessions, 884 F.3d
858, 870 (9th Cir. 2018) for decision on economic deprivation rising to the level of persecution. Such deprivation
must not be generalized, and is usually at least state-sponsored.
98
Lambert & Foster, supra note 79 at 150.
99
Ibid at 151.
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But several Hindu nationalist parties were in favour of reserving birth citizenship to Hindus and
Sikhs, and questioned whether Muslims, whose forefathers, in their belief, acted towards the
division of undivided India could ever pay true allegiance to India.100 Others were of the opinion,
that with renewed opportunities for creation of a nation-state, India should be restored to the
position that existed before an “inglorious” Mughal (or Muslim) or British invasion. Legally too,
the composition of India as a federal polity with a strong center (Union), emerged as a counter to
strong Muslim representation from any Muslim-majority provinces, afraid that the consequence
could be the demand for another separate state in the likes of Pakistan. 101
Although the demand for privileging citizenship of certain religions over the other was
ultimately discarded, several Constitutional scholars have noted the resurgence of Hindu
majoritarianism, and assertion of superior claims to citizenship, with the rise of Hindu nationalist
parties to power in the 1980s. 102 In other instances, religious minorities have been subjected to
forcible assimilation with the majority community, particularly in matters of personal laws.103
IV

Assam’s Experience with the NRC

The north-east Indian state of Assam shares a rather long and porous boundary with its Muslimmajority neighbor, Bangladesh, which in imperial India existed as a part of the larger state of
Bengal. On partition though, Bengal was divided into two parts over its religious composition,
despite sharing linguistic commonalities. 104 Eastern Bengal became a part of Pakistan, until its
independence in the 1971 Liberation war. Although the Islamic faith’s presence in Assam dates
to approximately the 12th century (while the British settled an additional number for migrant
labor purposes in the 19th and 20th centuries),105 Muslims have been primarily viewed as
invaders and “illegal migrants” by most of the high-caste native Hindu Assamese speakers. This
100

Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (London: Penguin, 1997) at 29-31.
See, Pritam Singh, Hindu Bias in Indian Constitution (New Delhi, Critical Quest, 2017) at 7-11 (statements of
CAD members such as Jagat Lal: “without centralization, history has seen it overpowered by foreign conquerors”,
Jaspat Roy Kapoor, and Ramchandra Gupta: “sympathies lying outside this country”).
102
Valerian Rodrigues, Citizenship & the Indian Constitution, 164, 174, and Nivedita Menon, “Citizenship & the
Basic Revolution”, in Rajeev Bhargava, ed, Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009) 190, Paul R Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence, 2nd ed, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 228.
103
Singh, supra note 101at 14-15.
104
Navine Murshid, “Assam and The Foreigner Within” (2016) 56:3 Asian Survey 581 at 589. The Bengal province
was divided for the first time in 1905, resulting in the three modern states of Assam, West Bengal (India) and East
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view is not isolated but coincides with the perception in the rest of India. Although this suspicion
was initially directed at all Bengali speaking population (Hindus and Muslims) who in the eyes
of the Assamese led to an erosion of their own “cultural and linguistic identities”,106 the constant
stream of refugees from Bangladesh gave the impression that most of such immigrants were
Muslims.107
In 2004, the Registrar General of India, responsible for overseeing the Census, released a data
breakdown on religious basis showing that the state’s Muslim population had risen at a higher
rate when compared to that across India (and second only to the Muslim-majority territory of
Kashmir).108 This lent a communalistic spin to the primarily linguistic and cultural antagonism in
the state, with claims of an Islamic infiltration from Bangladesh, particularly in the border
districts.109 Over the years, political leaders have appropriated this point to assert that the
intention of the community was to reduce the Hindu-populace to a minority.110
(a)

The Assam Accord

The Assam Accord of 1985, a trilateral agreement between the Government of India (GoI), the
state of Assam and nationalist parties in the Assam state, laid the basis for the current update in
the Citizen Register. The Accord’s objective was to identify, detain and deport “illegal migrants”
who entered the state after 1971. In 1951, the GoI enacted the Migrants (Expulsion from Assam)
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See, Assam Accord 1985, Government of Assam, clause 6, online:
<https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN_850815_Assam%20Accord.pdf>. The Clause promises
to undertake constitutional and administrative safeguards for preserving, promoting and protecting the cultural,
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Murshid, supra note 104 at 589.
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Wasbir Hussain, “Demographic Jitters”, Outlook (20 September 2004), online:
<https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/demographic-jitters/225190>.
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Pinku Muktiar, Prafulla Nath & Mahesh Deka, “The Communal Politics of Eviction Drives in Assam”, Economic
and Political Weekly (2018), online: <https://www.epw.in/engage/article/communal-politics-eviction-drivesassam>. 6 of Assam’s 27 districts have a Muslim-majority. These claims fail to acknowledge that the border regions
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that sees them as fresh migrants. In several cases they have also been forcefully evicted without compensation.
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names had not been included in the 1951 Census. When the census was conducted in 1961, these numbers were
reflected. See, Anindita Dasgupta, “The Myth of the Assamese Bangladeshi”, Himal Mag (31 July 2018), online:
<https://www.himalmag.com/the-myth-of-the-assamese-bangladeshi/>.
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construction of a common enemy).
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Act to address the issue of migratory influx post-partition, and proceeded to prepare the 1951
NRC, recording data such as name, age, sex, occupation, spouse/parent names, nationality. 111
But the list did not materialize, since the Indian Citizenship Act was only enacted in 1955, and
the Imperial legislation, Foreigners Act, 1946, was only amended in 1957 to include Pakistani
nationals under its purview.112 Without such amendment it would have been difficult to identify
and proceed against a “foreigner”.
In 1979, the issue of “illegal migration” peaked when these nationalist parties and their affiliates
engaged in widespread violence. By 1983, the state experienced the infamous Nellie massacre,
where the authorities failed to protect over 3000 individuals (mostly Muslims) from the native
Assamese (mostly Hindu) population. 113 This trigger also led the GoI to concede ground to these
nationalist parties’ demands in 1985, in the form of the Assam Accord.
The parties agreed that the Home Ministry (GoI) along with the Implementation of Assam
Accord Department would strive to implement the Accord. The year 1966 would serve as the
base year to detect foreigners. All those who had entered the state before 1966 and whose names
were present on the electoral rolls used in 1967, would stand regularized. Whereas those who
entered between 1966 and 24 March 1971, would be detected under the Foreigners Act, 1946
and Foreigners (Tribunal) Orders, 1964, and their names would be struck off the rolls. They
would need to register themselves with Registration Officers in their respective districts, but after
ten years, would be naturalized. However, all those who entered/continue to enter the State after
25 March 1971, would be detected, and expelled. 114 The GoI would issue citizenship certificates
to identified citizens, and only the signatory parties could bring complaints regarding any
“irregular issue” of certificates.115 To this effect, departments would be entrusted with
maintenance of birth and death registers. 116

Government of Assam: Home and Political Department, “White Paper on Foreigners Issue” (October 2012) at 36, online: Citizens for Justice and Peace <https://cjp.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/White-Paper-OnForeigners-Issue-20-10-2012.pdf>.
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The Accord was also legally adopted as Article 6A to the Indian Citizenship Act, 1955, to
provide Assam with a different cut-off date for citizenship, from the rest of India. 117
Nevertheless, Section 3 of the same Act provides that irrespective of legality of entry, children
born to “illegal migrants” could still be lawful birth citizens if, (a) they were born before 1 July
1987 (where both parents are ‘illegal migrants’), or (b) before 3 December 2004 (where either
parent is an ‘illegal migrant’. However, there has hardly ever been an occasion to test how these
two provisions operate outside the Assam situation – whether the Section 3 provision
overshadows Article 6A provision.
(b)

The NRC Procedure & the Inherent Arbitrariness

The procedure for carrying out the Assam NRC was prepared by a state level committee and
approved by the GoI in 2014. It relies on two documents: List A legacy documents that prove
that the individual or his ascendants are native to the region - including ownership documents,
names on the electoral rolls for elections previously held, and List B Linkage documents that
prove the individual’s relationship with such ascendant - such as Gram Panchayat certificates
(issued by village heads), birth and school certificates, etc. 118 It follows an applicationverification method, where individuals submit an application form with their details, followed by
an official/field verification by executive authorities. Accordingly, they draw up a family tree for
establishing linkage between family members. 119 On this basis, individuals have been
categorized as: Doubtful Voters (DV), those with cases pending against them before Foreigners
Tribunals, and Declared Foreigners (DF). Since India has no existing extradition treaty with
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White Paper, supra note 111 at 21.
Aminul Haque, State General Secretary & NCHRO Assam Chapter, “Note on Preparation/Updation of NRC”
(NCHRO Convention on NRC, Citizenship and Dissent, India International Centre, 23 September 2018), online:
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Bangladesh,120 those declared foreigners, could stand to be indefinitely detained, deported, or
effectively reduced to individuals without any substantive rights.
Most importantly, the entire procedure has been fraught with overbreadth in executive discretion.
The NRC has involved authorities of several ranks, including officials at the Election
Commission of India, the Government of Assam, Home and Political Department, and the
Assam High Court Registry. An official called the NRC Coordinator, has been responsible for
overseeing the data collection and management along with other officials at subordinate levels
(around 52,000 such subordinates were reportedly involved). These officials, whether at the top
or at the subordinate levels have divided the population into “original” and “non-original”
inhabitants, even in the absence of any definition or criterion. The latter have been subjected to
disproportionate verification standards despite the possession of relevant documents, 121 while the
former have been sometimes excused altogether from proof. Despite being brought to its notice,
the judiciary (Supreme Court) has refused to intervene altogether or seek the executive’s
clarification.122
In a state where record-keeping is not done meticulously, and where individuals lack knowledge
over procedures to apply for such documentation (or even that it is legally mandated), the NRC
has left entire masses vulnerable. In several cases, officials have denied accepting ration-cards
(akin to social-security cards) and delayed birth registration certificates, 123 even though the
Supreme Court has observed that they can be used as linkage documents. In other instances, they
have been rejected on flimsy technical grounds, such as spelling errors.124

See, Liz Mathew and Ravish Tiwari, “NRC Final List Released: 17 Resolutions Later, Tally Steals BJP’s
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Moreover, the Assam High Court, the highest constitutional court in the state, belatedly decided
that certain documents (such as Gram Panchayat certificates) would no longer be used for
identification purposes, even while acknowledging this could lead to the exclusion of entire
masses. Apparently, “public interest” would be better served considering the seriousness of the
immigration issue.125 The Supreme Court provided partial relief, holding that they could be used
for establishing linkage (and not to show that they were Indian citizens), but only after “strict
verification”.126 The judgement hit women and transgender applicants who lacked alternative
documents the hardest: since the former on marriage, usually relocated to other districts; while
the latter had to indulge in a lengthy explanation over why their present and former names, in
addition to their residential addresses were different. The arbitrariness in the procedure is telling
where individuals have been excluded even when their relatives have made it to the list, and the
Supreme Court has only considered the relatives’ inclusion to be a ‘material’ – not conclusive
evidence for proof of nationality. 127
(c)

What State Protection? How the Judiciary Failed Its Citizens

A prerequisite to the claim of persecution, is not merely the showing of harm howsoever severe,
but also the fact that there is no redressal available from the state. However international law
recognizes that it is not merely an act of the state, but also refusal to act (or passivity) that
contributes to persecution, even if it itself does not base such passivity on the protected identity
of the individuals.128 Doubts as to the fact of persecution arise where one state organ acts in a
persecutory manner, and other state organs that are meant to intervene in such instances do not
intervene.129 Thus, the legislature, executive and judiciary, whether individually or in concert,
could be carrying out persecutory policies, or enforcing neutral policies in a persecutory manner.
When that occurs, a reasonable perception created that the individual cannot turn to the state any
longer for protection.130 This sub-section discusses why the judiciary, especially the Supreme
125
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Court, has been criticized as complicit in the entire process of citizenship deprivation through
persecution.
In 2005, the Supreme Court struck down an Act titled, Illegal Migrants (Determination by
Tribunals) Act, 1983, reversing the burden to prove citizenship upon a suspected foreigner
applicant, on the Petition of the incumbent Head of the State. While equating the presence of
migrants with ‘external aggression’, the Court was led by documents that showed, without
further scrutiny, an overwhelming increase in the State’s population. 131 In the aftermath of this
Judgment, the Assam Government has dealt with suspected citizens under the Foreigners Act,
1946, and the Foreigners (Tribunal) Orders, 1964.
In 2014, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court relied upon the same judgement and the
inflated figures, to claim that the NRC had to be urgently updated because of ‘land-hungry
migrants, mostly Muslims’ and a hypothetical ‘Islamic fundamentalist vision of a larger
country’.132 According to sources, information collected over an Application under the Right to
Information Act stated that the Government did not have any accurate estimates, although a 2001
census that the Supreme Court itself relied on, claimed that almost half of the twelve million
“illegal migrants” resided in Assam. 133
Critics have noted that despite first admitting a petition praying for implementation of the Assam
Accord in 2009, the Supreme Court has played a more active role since 2014, involving itself in
overseeing the procedure and appointments, and calling for regular updates by the NRC
Coordinator seeking status of the detention centers as well as setting timelines.134 Moreover, the
Bench overseeing the matter has been presided on all occasions by a judge, who himself is an
ethnic Assamese, and is known to have publicly supported the NRC process, raising
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apprehensions of bias.135 When this was brought to his notice over an Application that sought his
recusal from future hearings, not only did he reject the Application and struck off the Applicant’s
name from a connected petition, but also admonished the GoI over its failure to commence
deportations which was not even an issue in the first place.136
In 2019, the same Bench clarified that the Assam case was an exception that although citizenship
could be traced back to either parent, descendants whose one parent had been found to be a
citizen, and the other marked as a DV, or had a pending case against them, would nevertheless be
categorized as a foreigner.137 In doing so, it also conflated the position of a DV (whose
citizenship is only contested) with an illegal migrant (whose case might have been adjudged).
The procedures before the Foreigners Tribunals (FTs) likewise, fail all procedural safeguards.
They are opaque and lack uniformity. FTs are quasi-judicial bodies which use summary
procedures allowing 10 days to a suspect to reply, 10 days to present evidence, and a 60 day
period within which they must dispose of cases. 138 They are free to decide what procedures,
including rules of evidence, they should adopt, again allowing them excessive discretion in
appreciating evidence. 139 They are presided upon by advocates, judges, retired civil servants and
even contractual staffers. This detail too was submitted at the Supreme Court’s disposal.
Curiously, the position was taken that prior to its operation, a two day procedural training would
be enough for the staff.140
They have also been vested with the powers to overhear appeals and the Assam High Court has
previously refused to exercise its writ jurisdiction through self-imposed restrictions, except on
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grounds of jurisdictional errors or violations of natural justice principles.141 Moreover, DFs are
excluded from appeals.142 This is concerning, since there is no second appreciation of facts or
evidence and more than often no ‘judicial’ application of mind. In several cases, appeal
procedures have been reported as compromised, with individuals not even being issued speaking
orders over their exclusion.143
Further, inclusion in the NRC and even citizenship determinations before civil courts, does not
guarantee security. There exist procedures parallel to the application-verification method, where
Electoral Registration Officers and the Border Police Organisation officials have the power to
mark individuals as suspicious or DVs and refer them to the FTs. 144 In 2018, the GoI placed on
record before the Court a Standard Operating Procedure meant for raising claims and objections
(over inclusion or exclusion from the draft list). 145 But the procedure as it stands allows anybody
to raise objections over the inclusion of an individual, with no penalties for false and frivolous
complaints.146 These provisions allow individuals to be dragged into the citizenship conundrum
multiple times, without any finality. Some media reports have also claimed that former
authorities who presided over these tribunals felt compelled to rule against individuals, as a
precondition to renewal of their contracts which was done at the instance of a state established
“monitoring committee”.147
In 2008, the Assam High Court had directed the state to build detention camps for housing DFs
and DVs.148 These camps are built within carceral institutions, but individuals are not allowed
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parole leaves, or prison visits. On the contrary, the Supreme Court through its own order has set
stringent conditions for release - only to those with three years of detention and exorbitant bail
bonds.149
(d)

Replicating an Assam model across India: Well-Founded Basis of Fear?

The evaluation of the well-founded basis of the fear of replicating an Assam model across India
is premised largely on current and former persecutory conduct that give a reasonable impression
that the individual could face future risks from a related action. Under IRL, once past conduct is
shown, there emerges a rebuttable presumption of risk over future conduct – unless there have
been fundamental changes to the circumstances, 150 in this case, change in governance perhaps or
other protective measures undertaken by the judiciary. This sub-section shows, why such
protection does not appear to be forthcoming.
Despite its roots in a parliamentary system, India’s constitutional courts have wide powers of
judicial review, including the power to strike down any executive, legislative and even
constitutive moves, which has the potential to alter the “basic structure” of the Constitution including rights to equality, secularism and the rights to approach courts for redress.151 In the
NRC matter, not only have the courts failed to halt a procedure commenced and supervised by
themselves, but they have also knocked on the executive for not concluding it sooner (by July
2019). In the Court’s opinion, all objections over the procedure, including the fact that millions
of children who are descendants of individuals that have either not been found to be foreigners,
or who have been termed so through compromised processes, could be handled as “incidental
issues”.152
The Assam Accord’s implementation was supposed to be confined to the issue of ‘illegal
migration’- irrespective of a religious criterion - at least on paper.153 But the discriminatory
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practices at implementation level have rendered many potentially stateless. Many individuals and
communities who have resided for generations, now stand excluded over their perceived
foreignness, although the term “illegal migrant” applies first and foremost to Muslims. This
tendency of finding Bengali Hindus as insiders, and Muslims as outsiders, has been apparent
through statements of senior functionaries, including those of the NRC Coordinator who has
specifically singled out “East-Pakistan Muslims” as cause for concern.154 Sources have widely
reported that almost nine out of ten FT cases were against Muslims, and almost ninety percent of
such cases resulted in a finding against the Applicant, as opposed to forty percent of findings
against Hindu Applicants.155 However, out of the 1.9 million excluded, there were several
Hindus, a result not anticipated by certain political groups for whom the majority Hindu
population serves as the vote bank. Following this outcome, these parties appealed to the
Supreme Court seeking a re-verification in the Muslim-majority districts. The petition was
however rejected by the Court. 156
Nevertheless, the CAA combined with the NRC would allow all non-Muslim communities to
find their way through into the citizenry lists – whether (or not) they were ‘illegal migrants’ - and
at the same time exclude genuine Indian Muslims who would be at the mercy of executive
discretion. In fact, this was legally affirmed in a recent case before the Karnataka High Court,
Archana Purnima Pramanik v State of Karnataka,157 where criminal proceedings under the
Foreigners Act, 1946, had been brought against the Applicant on the ground that she was a
Bangladeshi national who had been residing in the state at least since 2003, based on fraudulent
documentation. The Applicant in her Bail Application claimed that she was entitled to the benefit
of the newly amended CAA. In allowing her prayer, the Constitutional Court observed that her
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religion entitled her to contest that she could not be categorized as an “illegal migrant” and in
light of the same, even the charges under the Foreigners Act, 1946, could be dropped against her.
This is the same provision that also allows individuals to claim “persecution” for naturalization.
Finally, the Assam NRC has not been a stand-alone exercise, but has been preceded and
followed by widespread lynching of Muslims, perceived as “cow slaughterers”; anti-conversion
laws, including recently enacted legislations reminiscent of racial segregation, to curtail what the
state terms as attempts by Muslims to proselytize Hindus by luring women; targeting of religious
symbols; alteration of the autonomous status of the only Muslim-majority territory, Kashmir;
transferal of ownership of a contested land which was destroyed by Hindu majoritarian groups in
favor of the Hindu majority party, despite acknowledging the illegality of their acts and by
subjecting the minority to a higher standard of evidentiary requirements; excessive use of antiterror legislations against the minority community without substantial evidence; and hate acts of
violence and speeches not only considered as dehumanizing but with the potency to incite
violence.
In July 2019, the Indian government published a Notification about conducting a door-to-door
exercise of NPR to cull out a shorter list of citizens (NRC).158 The pilot project was to commence
earlier in 2020, despite there being no further instructions passed since 2019 – virtually leaving it
to officials to decide how it is implemented; thereby renewing fears amongst the community over
well-founded grounds of sustaining a nation-wide persecution where the only options are
between deportation, mass incarceration or survival as second-class citizens.
V

Conclusion

The international community’s response to the Indian citizenship practices has either been
restricted to the overt exclusion of Muslim refugees from naturalization, or have been described
as persecutory, without any preceding legal assessment. But legal assessments too, must not
completely skirt questions of politics and the fact that lawfully enacted neutral-appearing laws
can also possess adverse consequences. Prima facie, the Legislation appears to only exclude all
Muslim ‘refugees’ from naturalization – but Ministerial statements and practices, have actively
linked the Legislation with the preparation of a National Register of Citizens (NRC) to exclude
158
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‘infiltrators’ from the country, and the judiciary has been shown to be either complicit or
otherwise hesitant to correct executive positions. Assam has emerged as a mass-statelessness
project where the fate of over 1.9 million people hangs in a limbo – whether because of
administrative practices and errors, or through the mandatory requirement of documents and
proof which were never required under law; or in other cases, from a deliberate effort to exclude.
The current act of othering on religious and ethnic lines thus stands to preclude entire
communities from retaining their nationalities, although everyone barring Muslims would be
entitled to claim persecution as a ground for re-entry into the citizens’ lists.
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